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I;, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 7106 
BYRON S. AMBROSE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATEMEHT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah 
against the Defendant-Appellant, BYRON S. AMBROSE, alleging that 
the Defendant-Appellant intentionally or knowingly attempted to 
cause the death of Gordon Birrell, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), Sections 76-4-101 and 76-5-203, a felony of 
the second degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Defendant-Appellant was convicted by a jury and was 
represented by his court appointed attorney, D. John Musselman, 
Esq. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction 
and dismissal of the charges or in the alternative, a new trial. 
-1-
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STATEI!EllT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant-Appellant was tried twice in six months 
for attempted homicide arising from separate factual situations. 
This appeal directly concerns the second trialof September 14 
and 15, 1978. The first trial resulted in a mistrial and this 
court held that a retrial was barred by the double jeopardy 
provision of the Utah and Federal Constitutions. State of Utah 
v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (1979). 
During the course of the second trial, Frank Hitchell, 
alleged victim of the first incident, entered the courtroom, 
and the trial judge immediately called a recess. The judge 
asked Mr. Mitchell not to remain in the courtroom but allowed 
Mitchell's wife to stay in the audience. Mitchell remained in 
the courthouse accessible to the jury during breaks and recesses. 
No action was taken by the judge to isolate the jury from any 
prejudicial actions by Mitchell, his wife, or other third persons. 
The critical factual dispute in this case concerned the 
actual incident of the shooting. The prosecutor, in his closing 
argument to the jury, characterized the dispute as one of believing 
either the alleged victim or the defendant-appellant. To destroy 
the credibility of the defendant-appellant, the prosecutor relied 
substantially on evidence concerning the shots fired and the 
truck that was hit by those shots. Evidence was offered to 
explain the route of the bullets after they hit the truck. 
-2-
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The police impounded the truck as evidence and the truck remained 
in their custody until "we [the police] had gotten what we [the 
police) needed from it." Then the truck was released to the 
registered owner in Colorado. The police did not perform any 
ballistics tests on the truck and released it without informing 
the defendant-appellant. The defendant-appellant did not have 
the opportunity to perform any tests on the truck, or use the 
truck as evidence to bolster his credibility. The jury found 
the defendant-appellant guilty. Currently the defendant-appellant 
is incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. 
POIN? I 
THE PROSECUTION BREACHED THEIR DUTY TO PREVENT THE LOSS 
OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED IN VIOLATION 
OF DUE PROCESS. 
The prosecution in theclosing argument of this trial 
properly characterized the factual dispute to be resolved by the 
jury as deciding to believe either the alleged victim or to believe 
the defendant-appellant. (T 251:12-23) The prosecution strongly 
emphasized conflicting testimony between officer Bath and the 
defendant-appellant concerning the truck that received the bulk 
of the shots which were fired. (T 251-253) The Orem Police 
Department retained custody of the impounded truck as evidence 
until "we [the police) had gotten what we [the police) needed from 
it," and then it was released without notice to the defendant-
appellant to the registered owner in Colorado. (T 151:5-14). 
-3-
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No ballistics tests were performed on the truck by the police 
(T 150 and T 235: 23-27) and the defendant-appellant did not 
have any opportunity to perform tests on the truck or use the 
truck to establish his credibility. The defendant was convicted. 
This court has recognized that the prosecution is under 
a duty to treat the accused fairly (State of Utah v. Adams, 583 
P.2d 89 (1978)) and that a deliberate suppression or destruction 
of evidence by the prosecution constitutes a denial of due 
process if the evidence is material to the guilt or innocence 
of the accused. State of Utah v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477-479 
(Utah 1975) The duty to treat the defendant fairly extends 
not only to a deliberate destruction but also the negligent 
destruction of evidence material to the defense is tanamount to 
unlawful suppression and a denial of due process. People v. 
Harmes, 38 Colo. App. 378, 560 P.2d 470 (1976). Those charged 
with the prosecution have a duty to seek justice (Code of Profes-
sional Responsiblity, Canon 7, EC 7-13; see also ABA, Standards 
Relating to the Prosecution Function) and to prevent the loss or 
destruction of evidence favorable to the accused. People v. 
Roblas, 568 P.2d 57 (Colo. 1977). 
The duty of fairness to the accused also requires the 
prosecutionto affirmatively preserve evidence. This court 
recognized that principle in State of Utah v. Stewart, supra at 
479: 
-4-
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"Those charged with investigation and r:>rosecution of 
crime should retain intact all records and other evidence 
pertaining to the case until it is finally disposed of." 
The Supreme Court of Arizona in State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348, 
352, 464 P.2d 793, cert. denied, sub nom. Maloney v. Arizona, 
400 U.S. 841, 91 S. Ct. 82, 27 L. Ed.2d 75 (1970), stated: 
"[C]learly the state is not to decide for the court what is 
admissible, or, for the defense, what is useful." See also: 
Scales v. City Court, Citv of llesa, 122 Ariz. 231, 594 P.2d 97 
( 1979) . 
The State must, in order to insure due process under the 
5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and under 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, collect and 
preserve evidence that is reasonably and foreseeably favorable 
to the accused, especially when that evidence is in the immediate 
control of the prosecution. The Colorado Supreme Court in Garcia 
v. District Court, 21st Judicial District recently held: 
"The failure of the state to collect and preserve 
evidence, when those acts can be accomplished as a mere 
incident to a procedure routinely performed by state 
agents, is tanamount to suppression of that evidence. 
It is incumbent upon the state to employ regular proce-
dures to preserve evidence which a state agent, in the 
regular performance of his duties, could reasonably 
foresee 'might' be 'favorable' to the accused." 
[emphasis added] 589 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1979). 
Error is committed where the destroyed or lost evidence 
may have created a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt. 
U. S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.CT. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). 
-5-
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If the accused can make a showing of materiality of the lost 
evidence and prejudice to the accused, then the State's failure 
to preserve a truck should have resulted in a disnissal of the 
criminal charges. State of Idaho v. White, 98 Idaho 781, 572 
P.2d 884 (1977). 
In this case, the prosecution breached their duty of 
fairness to the accused and violated the accused's right of due 
process by failing to prevent the loss or destruction of evidence 
favorable to him. The Orem Police Department knew or should have 
known that a vehicle substantially involved in an alleged attempted 
homicide could be evidence favorable to the accused. The credi-
bility of the accused's testimony turned directly on the evidence 
of the shooting and the truck and the prosecutor so argued to 
the jury. The police failed to preserve the impounded vehicle in 
their possession and did not perform ballistics tests on the 
vehicle. The accused did not have the opportunity to so test the 
vehicle since the vehicle was returned to its owner in Colorado. 
If the accused had the opportunity to test the evidence, he may 
have bolstered his credibility before the jury and received an 
acquital. Because the error commited was prejudicial to the 
defendant-appellant his conviction should be reversed and the 
charges dismissed on grounds that defendant's due process rights 
were violated. 
-G-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY TAKE 
MEASURES TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED AND HOVE 
FOR DISMISSAL BASED ON THE LOSS OF FAVORABLE EVIDENCE. 
Mr. D. John Musselman, Esq., was the court appointed 
attorney for the defendant-appellant during his trial of September 
14 and 15, 1978. As previously argued in Point I of this brief, 
certain crucial evidence favorable to the defendant (a truck) 
was not preserved for trial and was unavailable for the accused's 
defense. Further, the record as a whole discloses that defendant's 
court appointed counsel failed to move for a dismissal based upon 
the loss of favorable evidence. 
The 6th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that the 
accused is entitled to the effective assistance of court appointed 
counsel if indigent. Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978). 
The test this court has adopted to examine the effectiveness of 
defense counsel was stated in State of Utah v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 
203 (Utah 1976): 
"The record must establish that counsel was ignorant of 
the facts or the law, resulting in withdrawal of a crucial 
defense, reducing the trial to a 'farce and a sham.'" 
supra at 204. 
-7-
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The Court in McNicol, supra, recognized the vital distinction 
between a constitutionally adequate defense consisting of a 
careful factual and legal investigation and tactical or strategic 
decisions after a careful factual and legal inquiry. 
A careful factual investigation by the defendant's 
counsel would have disclosed the vital importance the truck would 
hold in determining what happened at the scene of the alleged 
crime and in determining the credibility of the accused. It is 
not unreasonable to expect that the defendant would want his own 
ballistic reports on the gun and on the truck to establish his 
only defense. 
Most importantly, the defendant should not be punished 
or penalized for his court appointed counsel's procrastination 
in seeking to preserve relevant and favorable evidence. People 
v. Harmes, 38 Colo. App. 378, 560 P.2d 470 (1976). 
Further, once defense counsel had determined that the 
trial would turn on such factual evidence, and that such evidence 
was no longer available due to actions of the police (See Point 
in this brief), a careful legal inquiry into relevant law would 
have disclosed that a motion to dismiss should have been granted 
on the grounds that evidence favorable to the accused was lost or 
destroyed by the police. (See Point I of this brief). 
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The only reasonable explanation for the record in this 
case, is that the defense counsel was ignorant of the facts 
because of a lack of investigation and that he was unaware of 
relevant law that resulted in the withdrawal of a crucial defense 
reducing the trial to a sham. Had competent counsel been aware 
of the facts and law of this case, competency would require 
affirmative action to preserve the evidence or alternatively, a 
motion to dismiss based upon the loss or destruction of evidence 
favorable to the accused that was in police custody. The record 
does not disclose any action by counsel to preserve the truck as 
evidence, or to move to dismiss on grounds of prosecution destruc-
tion of evidence. Such error was prejudicial to the accused and 
denied him the effective assistance of court appointed counsel. 
Therefore, alternatively, the defendant-appellant's 
conviction should be reversed and the case dismissed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO TAKE PROPER PROTECTIVE MEASURES 
TO ISOLATE THE JURY FRO!! PREJUDICIAL ACTIONS AND INFORMATION IN 
VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED'S RIGHTS TO AN HIPARTIAL JURY AND DUE 
PROCESS. 
The record discloses that during the course of this trial, 
the alleged victim of the accused in a previous trial, Frank 
~itchell, entered the courtroom during the testimony and the 
trial judge immediately called a recess. (T 112:9-30, 113, 114, 
-9-
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115:1-29). Mitchell's wife was also present during the trial. 
Mitchell was asked to leave the courtroom but was allowed to 
remain in the courthouse, accessible to the jurors. (T 242, 243). 
Mitchell's wife remained in the courtroom (T 115). No action 
was taken by the trial judge to prevent further prejudicial 
occurances to the jury. 
It is well established in Utah "that due process require-
ments of the Constitution of Utah and the United States guarantee 
that an accused receive a trial before a fair and impartial jury 
free from outside influences." State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 
1348 (Utah 1977) cert. denied 439 U.S. 882 (1978). Further, the 
U. S. Supreme Court has mandated that when necessary the trial 
judge must take appropriate measures to maintain a fair and 
impartial jury free from outside influences. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 
384 U.S. 333, 86 S.CT. 1507, 16 L.Ed. 2d 600 (1966). See also: 
State v. Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947). 
Recently the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the trial 
judge has the affirmative constitutional duty to minimize 
prejudicial acts and may order sequestration of the jury or take 
any of a variety of protective measures even when they are not 
strictly and inescapably necessary in order to insure that 
inadmissible prejudicial information be kept from the jury. 
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, u.s. , 99 S.Ct. 2898 
(1979). Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court in DePasquale, supra, 
held that the right to an impartial jury is personal to the 
-10-
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accused and that members of the public have no constitutional 
right to attend criminal trials. Thus, the public may be excluded 
from criminal trials. 
The failure of the trial judge to exclude both Frank 
Mitchell and his wife from the courtroom and the courthouse where 
the jury was present during breaks and recesses was prejudicial 
error in light of the informative record. (T 248:8-11) Alter-
natively, the trial judge should have taken other protective 
measures such as sequestration to isolate the jury from any 
potential prejudicial comments or actions. The record discloses 
that poor facilities were perhaps the underlying reason for not 
sequestering the jury. (T 18:15-18). 
Therefore, because of the actual prejudicial actions 
that took place in or near the courtroom, the trial judge failed 
to take necessary protective measures such as exclusion of the 
public and sequestration of the jury to preserve the accused's 
right to trial by an impartial jury and right to due process 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, Sixth Amendnent and the 
Utah Consititution, Article I, Section 12. Such failure resulted 
in actual prejudice to the accused and the defendant-appellant's 
conviction should be reversed and a new trial granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The loss or destruction of evidence favorable to the 
defendant was a breach of the prosecution's duty of fairness and 
-11-
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violative of due process. Said breach requires the conviction 
to be reversed and the case dismissed. Alternatively, said 
loss or destruction of favorable evidence was caused by ineffective 
court appointed counsel because of counsel's ignorance of the facts 
and of the law resulting in the withdrawal of a crucial defense 
to the accused which reduced the trial to a sham, requiring a 
reversal of the conviction and dismissal of the action. 
r,roreover, the trial judge failed to take proper protective 
measures to preserve the accused's constitutional right to trial 
by an impartial jury. Under this theory, the conviction must 
be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z.r day of October, 1979. 
E. KENT SU!!DBERG 
Attorney for Appellant 
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